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Abstract
We document robust empirical evidence that, after controlling for idiosyncratic volatil-
ity, large stocks earn significantly higher returns than small stocks. Our empirical results
indicate that idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to return, but negatively related
to size. Hence, failure to control for idiosyncratic volatility generates a downward omitted
variable bias and leads to the widely documented negative relation between size and return.
We explain the two contrasting size-return relations, with and without the control for id-
iosyncratic volatility, in a parsimonious equilibrium model that incorporates three empirical
regularities: some individual investors are under-diversified; small stocks have higher idiosyn-
cratic volatilities than large stocks; and large stocks, relative to their size, are held by fewer
investors than small stocks. Investors follow mean-variance optimization to allocate wealth
among their stocks. To clear the markets, large stocks have to offer higher expected re-
turns to induce their relatively smaller number of investors to allocate more of their wealth.
This positive size-return relation is masked because small firms have higher idiosyncratic
volatilities and therefore earn higher returns as a result of investor under-diversification.
Keywords: size effect; cross-section of stock returns; investor under-diversification
JEL classification codes: G12; G11
1 Introduction
Studies have documented that small stocks earn higher average returns than large stocks.
This cross-sectional stock return pattern is often referred to as the “size effect”.1 In the
sample of the stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during January 1926 to
December 2009, we confirm this traditional negative size effect. Like Schwert (2003), we find
that the size effect is stronger in early subsample periods and has largely disappeared since
documented by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981).
More interestingly, we find that, after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility, the size
effect becomes positive — large stocks earn significantly higher returns than small stocks.
Specifically, in standard Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns, without idiosyncratic
volatility as a regressor, the slope on size is negative; when idiosyncratic volatility is included
as a control, the slope on size turns positive and highly significant. The positive size-return
relation remains significant after controlling for other usual determinants of cross-sectional
returns. The evidence is also robust in both early and later subsample periods. We further
demonstrate the quantitative magnitudes of the positive size-return relation using portfolio
sorts. In each month, we sort stocks first by idiosyncratic volatility and then by size into
10× 10 portfolios, using the breaking points of NYSE stocks. Within the same idiosyncratic
volatility deciles, the average return spreads between the largest and smallest size portfolios
range between 0.64% and 2.60% per month. These large return spreads are not explained
by the Fama-French three factors.
Our empirical results indicate that small firms have high idiosyncratic volatilities. We
also confirm the findings in earlier studies that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities, or
residual standard deviations, earn high returns. As a result, idiosyncratic volatility creates
a negative link between size and return. Failure to control for idiosyncratic volatility results
1See Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) for the first finding of this effect, and Schwert (1983) for a survey
of early studies. Fama and French (1992) and Schwert (2003) extend the analysis to more recent data.
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in a downward omitted variable bias and leads to the widely documented negative relation
between size and return.
We explain the two contrasting size-return relations, unconditional and conditional on
idiosyncratic volatility, in a parsimonious equilibrium model. The model economy is popu-
lated with a large number of stocks of different size and an even larger number of investors.
Most importantly, the model incorporates three empirical regularities: (1) some individual
investors are under-diversified; (2) small stocks have high idiosyncratic volatilities; (3) large
firms, relative to their size, are held by fewer investors than small firms. Evidence for the first
empirical regularity is well documented.2 For the second empirical regularity, the correlation
between size and idiosyncratic volatility is -0.52 in our sample. We also provide evidence for
the last empirical regularity in the paper. Specifically, we regress log number of shareholders
on log market capitalization and the result suggests roughly a square-root dependence —
a stock that is four times as large has on average about twice as many investors. In other
words, while larger stocks are held by more investors, the relation between the number of
investors and stock size is concave: the size-scaled number of investors decreases with stock
size.
In the baseline setup, we focus on under-diversified individual investors. This is con-
sistent with the observation that such investors play a dominant role in the stock market
for a large part of our sample period. In recent decades, a growing number of individual
investors hold stocks through institutions, and thus become diversified. To explore the im-
plications of this development, we also investigate an extended setup which accommodates
diversified individual investors by introducing large and diversified mutual funds into the
model economy.
Specifically, in the baseline model, investors hold different portfolios of a small number of
2As surveyed in Campbell (2006), earlier studies find that the number of stocks held by a typical household
or individual investor is only one or two. More recently, this number appears to increase to about four [Barber
and Odean (2000) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)].
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stocks, and allocate wealth among their stocks following mean-variance optimization. The
expected return of a stock is determined in the equilibrium so that the aggregated demand
from investors holding the stock equals the supply, i.e., the market capitalization of the stock.
We calibrate the model parameters so that the model reproduces the salient quantitative
features of the empirical data. In our baseline calibration, the model economy contains
2,000 stocks and 200,000 investors each holding 4 stocks. We solve the model numerically
and obtain the cross sections of size, idiosyncratic volatility, and expected return in simulated
model economies.
The model generates the same patterns as documented in the empirical data. High
idiosyncratic volatility stocks earn higher returns than low idiosyncratic volatility stocks.
Without the control for idiosyncratic volatility, small firms exhibit higher returns than large
firms, i.e., the traditional size effect. After controlling for idiosyncratic volatility, the size-
return relation turns positive.
To identify the economic mechanisms underlying the relations between size, idiosyncratic
volatility, and return, we conduct counterfactual experiments on the model. Specifically, we
make changes, one at a time, on each of the three empirical regularities incorporated in the
model. If we set the size-scaled number of investors to be the same for large and small
firms (i.e., the number of investors increases linearly with stock size), the size-return relation
conditional on idiosyncratic volatility becomes flat. If we increase the number of stocks
held by investors (i.e., investor portfolios are more diversified), both the relation between
idiosyncratic volatility and return and the relation between size and return controlling for
idiosyncratic volatility become less positive. If we set zero correlation between size and
idiosyncratic volatility, the model yields a strong positive relation between size and return,
with or without the control for idiosyncratic volatility.
These experiments suggest that the positive size-return relation results from the joint
effect of investor under-diversification and the decreasing size-scaled number of investors.
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Although large stocks are held by more investors, they have, when scaled by size, fewer
investors than small stocks. Consequently, in equilibrium, large stocks have to offer higher
expected returns to induce their relatively smaller number of investors to allocate more
of their wealth. These experiments also confirm that the positive relation between idiosyn-
cratic volatility and return is driven by investor under-diversification. Idiosyncratic volatility
contributes to the risk of under-diversified portfolios, and thus under-diversified investors de-
mand higher returns for stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatilities. Lastly, because small
firms have higher idiosyncratic volatilities and thus earn higher returns than large firms, this
gives rise to a negative link between size and return via idiosyncratic volatility. The positive
size-return relation due to the decreasing size-scaled number of investors is masked by this
negative link. Controlling for idiosyncratic volatility unveils this mask.
As robustness checks, we investigate a few variants of the baseline model. We impose
restrictions on investor shorting and borrowing, and relax the assumption that all investors
hold equal wealth. We increase the number of stocks as well as the number of investors. The
results from these variants are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar to those of
the baseline model.
Finally, we investigate an extension of the baseline model, in which the economy contains
under-diversified individual investors as well as large and diversified mutual funds. This ex-
tended setup reflects the growing trend over the recent decades among individual investors
to hold stocks through institutions and thus become diversified. The results from the ex-
tended model remain qualitatively the same, though smaller in magnitude. This, of course,
is anticipated since the relations between size, idiosyncratic volatility, and return critically
depend on investor under-diversification.
Our model is a return to the tradition of the classic studies of Sharpe (1964) and Lint-
ner (1965) on the CAPM, and the seminal papers of Levy (1978) and Merton (1987) on
the impact of investor under-diversification. In our model, like in these classic studies, in-
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vestors allocate wealth among their stocks following mean-variance optimization, and stocks
are economic commodities whose prices are determined by crossing supply and demand in
the equilibrium. This equilibrium approach reveals important insights that do not readily
transpire in the factor pricing framework.
Based on under-diversified investors’ demand equations for stocks, Merton (1987) also
suggests a positive size-return relation. However, the positive relation in our model is dif-
ferent from his. In Merton (1987), the relation is obtained from the partial derivative of
investors’ demand equation with respect to size, holding everything else fixed. In our model,
the positive size-return relation arises in the equilibrium cross section of expected returns as
a result of the decreasing size-scaled number of investors. To clear the markets, large stocks
offer higher expected returns to induce more demand from their relatively smaller number of
investors. This intuition has not yet been proposed in the existing literature. Moreover, our
model incorporates key empirical regularities and replicates the cross-sectional joint distribu-
tions of size, idiosyncratic volatility, and the number of investors in the empirical data. The
solutions of the simulated model economies demonstrate the equilibrium cross section rela-
tions between size, idiosyncratic volatility, and stock return, which can be directly compared
with the real data.
In addition, the focus of Merton (1987) is not on the relation between size and return.
Instead, he illustrates the importance of investor recognition (or investor base) on stock
returns. Inspired by his work, a number of empirical studies provide supporting evidence to
his prediction that broader investor recognition is associated with lower expected returns.3
The investor recognition literature often uses the number of shareholders to measure how
well-known a stock is. Our study uses the number of shareholders scaled by size to reflect
investor demand for stocks. These two quantities, while related, are meant to capture very
3See, among others, Kadlec and McConnell (1994), Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999), Foerster and
Karolyi (1999), Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), and Dyl and Elliott (2006), and Bodnaruk and
Ostberg (2009).
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different economic concepts. Large stocks are known to and held by more investors than
small stocks. The increase in the number of investors with size, however, is not linear,
but concave. The investor recognition literature and our paper address distinct research
questions. Their focus is on the relation between investor recognition and stock returns,
while we examine how the concavity plays an important role in explaining the size-return
relation in the cross section.
The economic mechanism proposed in our paper for the size-return relation depends in
part on the positive, contemporaneous relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return.
This positive relation is documented empirically in Friend, Westerfield, and Granito (1978)
and Levy (1978), which we confirm in an extended sample. The theoretical intuition that
investor under-diversification drives the positive relation is demonstrated in Levy (1978) and
Merton (1987), which we also verify in our model.4 In one of the counterfactual experiments,
when we increase the number of stocks held by investors while keeping everything else the
same, the positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return becomes weaker. This
vividly demonstrates how investor diversification affects the pricing of idiosyncratic risk.
In addition, as mentioned above, the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return
becomes less positive when mutual funds are introduced into the model.
Our paper also suggests a potential explanation for the widely documented negative
relation between size and return. Namely, it results from an omitted variable bias due to
the failure to control for idiosyncratic volatility. This explanation provides an interesting
4In contrast to the positive, contemporaneous relation, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) report a
negative relation between return and the previous-month idiosyncratic volatility. Fu (2009) suggests that the
contrasting results are due to the fact that idiosyncratic volatility varies substantially from month to month,
and thus the idiosyncratic volatility of the previous month could be very different from the idiosyncratic
volatility for the current month. Moreover, Fu (2009) shows that, consistent with the positive relation, high
idiosyncratic volatilities in the previous month are accompanied with high returns in the same month. The
low returns in the following month observed by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) are largely due to the
subsequent month return reversal documented in Jegadeesh (1990). We therefore follow the classic studies
to use the contemporaneous idiosyncratic volatility that reveals the positive relation between return and
idiosyncratic volatility.
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alternative to the economic insights on the size effect highlighted in a number of influential
studies such as Chan and Chen (1991), Berk (1995), Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), and
Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003).
In the rest of the paper, we first discuss the data in Section 2. Section 3 reports the
empirical evidence on stock returns and the decreasing size-scaled number of investors. We
present the model in Section 4 and discuss the calibration of parameters. In Section 4.5,
we present the numerical solution of the model equilibrium, discuss the results, and explore
the underlying economic intuition. The concluding section summarizes the key insights and
proposes potential extensions of our study.
2 Data and variables
Our full sample consists of the stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during
the period of January 1926 to December 2009, with 3,549,169 firm-month observations in
total. Stock returns (RET) are monthly, and XRET is the return in excess of the one-month
T-bill rate. Market capitalization (ME) is the product of the end-of-month closing price and
the number of shares outstanding, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index and expressed in
millions of year 2000 dollars. Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is the standard deviation of the
residuals from regressing individual stock returns on market returns. Specifically, for stock i,
in month t, we run a time-series regression of the daily stock returns on the contemporaneous
and three lagged value-weighted market returns:
RETi,τ = αi,t + β0,i,tMRETτ + β1,i,tMRETτ−1
+ β2,i,tMRETτ−2 + β3,i,tMRETτ−3 + εi,τ , day τ ∈ month t. (1)
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Here, RETi,τ is the return of stock i on day τ in month t, and MRET is the market return.
We compute IVOL by multiplying the standard deviation of the regression residuals with
the square root of the number of trading days in month t. The use of the lagged market
returns is to adjust for the effect of non-synchronous trading [Dimson (1979)].
As specified above, idiosyncratic volatility is estimated using the CAPM. This is close in
spirit to the theoretical model presented later, in which the economy is driven by a single
macroeconomic factor. In unreported robustness checks, we also find similar empirical results
if idiosyncratic volatility is measured using the Fama-French three-factor model.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. Since ME and IVOL are
positively skewed, we take natural logarithm and report the summary statistics of log(ME)
and log(IVOL) as well. Table 2 reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional simple
correlations between the stock return, log(ME), and log(IVOL). The correlation between size
and return is negative and significant. This is consistent with the traditional size effect —
small firms earn higher returns than large firms. The correlation between return and IVOL
is significantly positive; high idiosyncratic volatility is associated with high return. Finally,
the correlation between size and IVOL is -0.52, negative and statistically significant: small
firms have more volatile stock returns.
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes CSHR, the number of common shareholders. The funda-
mental annual file of Compustat reports this data item since fiscal year 1975. The statistics
for this variable is based on 201,062 firm-year observations during the period 1975–2009.
The variable CSHR is positively skewed. We also take log transformation and report the
summary statistics of log(CSHR).
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3 Empirical evidence
We first investigate the relations between firm size, idiosyncratic volatility, and return, and
then the relation between the number of shareholders and firm size.
3.1 Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns
We use the Fama-MacBeth regressions to examine the empirical relations between size,
idiosyncratic volatility, and return. Each month, we regress individual stock excess returns
on lagged log(ME), on log(IVOL), and on both variables, respectively. We report the time-
series averages of the slope coefficients and compute the t-statistics as the time-series averages
of the slopes divided by the corresponding time-series standard errors. We examine the full
sample period 1926:01–2009:12 and two subperiods: the early period 1926:01–1967:12, and
the later period 1968:01–2009:12. The results are reported in Table 3.
For the unconditional relation between size and return, we regress excess stock returns on
lagged log(ME) and obtain negative and significant slopes. Hence, consistent with existing
studies, small firms exhibit higher returns than large firms. Existing studies also suggest
that the relation between size and return varies over time.5 The results in Table 3 indicate
that the slope on size is smaller in magnitude in the later sample period
For the unconditional relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return, regressing
excess stock returns on log(IVOL) obtains positive and significant slopes. The results confirm
the findings of Friend, Westerfield, and Granito (1978) and Levy (1978). The slopes are
significant in both subperiods, while the magnitude decreases over time.
The key interest of our study is the size-return relation after controlling for idiosyncratic
volatility. As shown in Table 3, when both log(ME) and log(IVOL) are included as regressors,
the slope on log(ME) becomes positive and significant. That is, controlling for idiosyncratic
5See the survey in Schwert (2003).
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volatility, stock returns are positively related to size. The results for the two subsample
periods also suggest that the slope decreases over time.
Studies have shown that a number of variables are related with cross-sectional stock
returns. To investigate the robustness of the empirical results on the relations between size,
idiosyncratic volatility, and return, we include additional variables in the Fama-MacBeth
regressions. These additional variables include the ratio of book-to-market equity, liquidity
and its variance,6 and past returns. We follow Fama and French (1992) for the ratio of
book-to-market equity, Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001) for liquidity and
its variance, Jegadeesh (1990) for the preceding month returns, and Jegadeesh and Titman
(2001) for the past 6-month (skipping the preceding month) returns. Some of these additional
variables are not available prior to 1960s, and thus we report the regression results for the
later subperiod of 1968:01–2009:12. As shown in Table 4, with these additional controls, the
key empirical results remain qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar: without the
control for idiosyncratic volatility, the size-return relation is negative; after controlling for
idiosyncratic volatility, the size-return relation becomes positive.
The dependent variables in the regressions above are stock excess returns XRET. As
indicated in Table 1, XRET is somewhat right-skewed, with a skewness of 1.69 in the full
sample. In contrast, the skewness of log excess returns, log(100+XRET), is -0.56 in the full
sample, and -0.60 in the later subperiod of 1968:01–2009:12. As a robustness check, Table 4
also reports the regression of log excess returns on log(ME), log(IVOL), and the additional
control variables. The results again confirm our key result: controlling for idiosyncratic
volatility, the relation between size and return is positive and significant.
6Because large stocks tend to be more liquid, the implication of the liquidity effect — less liquid stocks
earn higher returns — is opposite to our finding of the positive size-return relation. This intuition suggests
that our finding is not due to the liquidity effect, which is confirmed by the empirical evidence.
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3.2 Portfolio sorting
We use portfolio sorting to demonstrate the quantitative magnitudes of the empirical rela-
tions documented in the Fama-MacBeth regressions.
The results on size portfolios are presented in Table 5. In each month, we sort stocks
into deciles based on ME of the previous month, and following Fama and French (1992),
we use the breaking points based on the ME of NYSE stocks only. We compute the equal-
and value-weighted portfolio returns and report the time-series averages. Besides the full
sample period and the early and later subperiods, we also examine the most recent period
of 1982:01–2009:12, which is after the documentation of the size effect in Banz (1981) and
Reinganum (1981). Consistent with existing studies and confirming the regression results
presented earlier, small stocks earn higher average returns. In addition, the return spread
between the largest and the smallest ME deciles is much more negative in the early subsample
period than in the later period, and becomes insignificant during the most recent decades.7
Table 6 presents the results on idiosyncratic volatility sorted portfolios. In each month,
we sort stocks into deciles by IVOL, using the breaking points based on the IVOL of NYSE
stocks only. Confirming the regression results, stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities earn
higher returns than stocks with low idiosyncratic volatilities. Further, comparison across the
two subperiods indicates that the return spread decreases over time.
To demonstrate the size-return relation conditional on idiosyncratic volatility, we em-
ploy a sequential sorting procedure to form stock portfolios that have similar idiosyncratic
volatility but very different size. In each month, we first sort stocks into deciles based on
IVOL, and then sort the stocks in each IVOL decile into 10 portfolios based on ME of the
previous month. In both steps of sorting, we use the breaking points based on NYSE stocks
only. The purpose of the first sort is to narrow down the variation of IVOL, while the second
7Schwert (2003) suggests the disappearance of the negative size-return relation could be due to increased
arbitrage activities since the finding of the size effect.
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sort separates the stocks with similar IVOL by size.
For each month, this sequential sorting yields 100 portfolios. Table 7 presents the time-
series averages of median ME and median IVOL for the 100 portfolios. Panel A shows that
within each IVOL decile, stocks in different ME portfolios exhibit very different size. Panel B
demonstrates that the sequential sorting effectively controls for idiosyncratic volatility across
size portfolios. For IVOL deciles 1 to 9, the spreads of median IVOL between the largest
and the smallest size portfolios are all below 1%. In other words, within IVOL deciles 1 to
9, there is little variation in IVOL across the size portfolios.
The highest IVOL decile is an exception. Panel B shows that the median IVOL decreases
by about 10% from size deciles 1 to 10. In other words, for the size portfolios in the highest
IVOL decile, the sequential sorting does not achieve an effective control for idiosyncratic
volatility. Hence, the interpretation of the portfolio return results for this IVOL decile
requires special attention.
We compute the equal- and value-weighted excess returns in each month for the 100
portfolios and Table 8 reports the time-series averages for the full sample period. Within
each of IVOL deciles 1 to 9, the average portfolio returns increase with size; the return spreads
between size deciles 10 and 1 are positive and statistically significant. For the full sample, the
average monthly return spreads range between 0.64% and 2.60% for equal-weighted portfolio
returns. In addition, we run the time-series regressions of the return spreads on the Fama-
French three factors. As reported in the last column of Table 8, the estimated intercepts,
or the alphas, are positive and statistically significant. As noted earlier, for IVOL deciles 1
to 9, the control for IVOL across the size portfolios is effective. Hence, the positive return
spreads suggest a positive relation between size and return.
In the highest IVOL decile, however, the return decreases with size, and the return
spread between ME deciles 10 and 1 is negative and significant. As noted earlier, there is
a substantial decrease in IVOL across the size portfolios in the highest IVOL decile. Since
12
idiosyncratic volatility and return are positively correlated, if the effect of the decreasing
IVOL dominates, this can give rise to the negative return spread in the highest IVOL decile.
In addition, although the highest IVOL decile consists of about 26% of the stocks in num-
ber, it supplies less than 3% of the total market capitalization.8 The economic importance
of this decile is likely small.9
For the subsample periods of 1926:01–1967:12 and 1968:01–2009:12, Panel B of Table 8
reports the return spreads between the largest and smallest size portfolios for each of the 10
IVOL deciles. The results are similar to those for the full sample period: for IVOL deciles 1
to 9, the return spreads are positive and significant; for IVOL decile 10, the return spread
is negative. The results also indicate smaller magnitudes for the return spreads in the later
period.
3.3 Omitted variable bias
In summary, our empirical results confirm the widely documented negative relation between
size and return, and further, demonstrate that after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility,
the relation becomes positive. These empirical results suggest a potential explanation of the
conventional negative size effect. That is, failure to control for idiosyncratic volatility results
in an omitted variable bias, which leads to the negative relation. The bias is downward
8The numbers of stocks are different across the IVOL deciles because the stocks are sorted using the
breaking points based on NYSE stocks only. Consistent with the negative correlation between size and
idiosyncratic volatility, the highest IVOL decile contains very small stocks.
9We conduct additional robustness checks. The highest IVOL decile contains very small stocks. Small
stocks with high return volatilities have a higher probability to be delisted in the following period than
large stocks. The CRSP’s monthly stock return file does not include delisting returns. This creates a
survivorship bias, which has been shown contributing to the negative return spread between large and small
stocks [Shumway and Warther (1999)]. When we include delisting returns (obtained from CRSP’s monthly
stock event file) in computing the portfolio returns, the return spread between the largest and smallest size
portfolios in the highest IVOL decile indeed becomes less negative. Including delisting returns has little
impact on the return spreads between the size portfolios in the other IVOL deciles.
We also find that after excluding January stock returns, the portfolio return results are similar to those
in Panel A of Table 8. As a matter of fact, the return spreads between the largest and the smallest size
portfolios in IVOL deciles 1 to 9 become more positive, while the negative spread in IVOL decile 10 becomes
smaller in magnitude.
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because idiosyncratic volatility is negatively related to size, but positively related to return,
thus creating a negative link between size and return.
This downward bias is explained in more detail in the appendix. Specifically, two channels
contribute to the unconditional relation between size and return. The first channel is the
positive size-return relation conditional on idiosyncratic volatility, which we document in
this study. In the second channel, size is negatively correlated with idiosyncratic volatility,
which, in turn, is positively associated with return. This negative, second channel gives
rise to the downward bias, and it more than offsets the positive, first channel, resulting in
the unconditional negative relation between size and return. In other words, the positive
relation is masked by the negative link between size and return via idiosyncratic volatility.10
Controlling for idiosyncratic volatility removes the mask.
3.4 Number of individual investors
In this section, we illustrate the empirical relation between the number of investors and stock
size. Our measure for the number of investors is CSHR, the number of common shareholders
reported in the fundamental annual file of Compustat since fiscal year 1975. As perhaps
the only source of information on the number of shareholders for a large panel of US firms,
CSHR is frequently used in the investor recognition literature to measure how well-known a
stock is. Our study, however, focuses on its relation with stock size.
For each year of 1975–2009, we run a cross-sectional regression of log(CSHR) on log(ME).
Table 9 reports that the time-series average of the slope on log(ME) is 0.42, and the time-
series average of R2 is about 34%. A positive slope suggests that larger firms are held by
more investors. This is consistent with the intuition that larger firms tend to be more well-
known, and thus attract more investors. If the slope is 1, it implies that the number of
10Similarly, for the unconditional relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return, there is also a
downward bias because size is the omitted variable. The bias weakens the positive relation, but is not strong
enough to flip the sign. See the appendix for more details and Table 3 for the empirical results.
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investors increases linearly with firm size, or equivalently, the size-scaled number of investors
is the same for all firms. A slope between 0 and 1 suggests that, while larger stocks are held
by more investors, the relation between the number of investors and stock size is concave:
the size-scaled number of investors decreases with stock size.
Due to the inclusion of institutional investors, CSHR as the proxy for the number of in-
dividual investors involves measurement errors. Evidence from the 13f institutional holding
dataset, however, suggests that the resulting impact is likely small. The increasing predom-
inance of institutional investors is a phenomenon less than three decades old. In 1980, the
total number of institutional investors is only about 500; the median institutional ownership
is below 10% for NYSE stocks and zero for NASDAQ stocks. In other words, the influence of
institutional investors is rather small in the early years of our sample. Nonetheless, we still
find that the slope coefficients are about 0.50 in the late 1970s to early 1980s. In addition, we
adjust both CSHR and ME to exclude the effect of institutional investors — we subtract the
number of institutional investors from CSHR, and the market capitalization held by these
institutional investors from ME — and then run regressions of log adjusted CSHR on log
adjusted ME. The time series average of the slope coefficients increases only slightly to 0.46,
and the average R2 is about the same.
To summarize, the empirical results indicate that, relative to their size, large firms are
held by fewer investors, or equivalently, the size-scaled number of investors decreases with
firm size. As shown subsequently in the model, this empirical fact together with investor
under-diversification generate a positive relation between size and return. The smaller the
slope coefficient calibrated for the relation between log(CSHR) and log(ME) (i.e., the stronger
the concavity), the larger the magnitude of the model results. Our model calibration will
use a conservative value of 0.5, which implies a square-root relation between the number
of investors and firm size: a firm four times as large has on average about twice as many
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investors.11
4 Model
In this section, we present a parsimonious equilibrium model of many stocks and numerous
investors. Our model builds on those in the classical CAPM literature and the seminal
studies of Levy (1978) and Merton (1987). In the model economy, investors are mean-
variance optimizers over their stocks, and the expected return of each stock is determined so
that the aggregated demand equals the supply. Further, we incorporate into the model three
empirical regularities observed in the data — some individual investors are under-diversified,
large firms have lower idiosyncratic volatilities than small firms, and the size-scaled number
of investors decreases with firm size.
In the baseline setup, we focus on under-diversified individual investors. This is consistent
with the observation that such investors play a dominant role in the stock market for a large
part of our sample period. In recent decades, a growing number of individual investors hold
stocks through institutions, and thus become diversified. To explore the implications of this
development, we investigate an extended setup which accommodates diversified individual
investors by introducing large and diversified mutual funds into the model economy.
We calibrate the model to match the salient quantitative properties of the empirical data,
and explore the model implications on the cross section of stock returns. As shown subse-
quently, with investor under-diversification, the model generates a positive relation between
idiosyncratic volatility and return. More importantly, the decreasing size-scaled number of
investors and investor under-diversification generate a positive relation between size and re-
turn. These results, together with the negative correlation between size and idiosyncratic
11Here is an example to illustrate the decreasing size-scaled number of investors. At the end of fiscal year
1975, Eastman Kodak has a market capitalization of $17.12 billion and is owned by 237.5 thousand investors;
Xerox has a market capitalization of $4.05 billion and is owned by 135.6 thousand investors.
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volatility, can explain the empirical relations between size, idiosyncratic volatility, and return
as documented in the paper.
4.1 Stocks
The model has two periods, time 0 and time 1, and consistent with our empirical analysis,
the interval is one month. The economy is driven by a single macroeconomic factor
F˜i = σF f˜ , f˜ ∼ N(0, 1). (2)
The factor has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of σF , and the factor shock f˜ is a
standard normal random variable.
The economy is populated with a large number of stocks. Stock i pays out a random
cash flow at time 1,
C˜i = Ci(1 +BiF˜ + σiε˜i), ε˜i ∼ N(0, 1), corr[ ε˜i, f˜ ] = 0. (3)
Here, Ci is the mean, Bi is the exposure of the cash flow to the macroeconomic factor, and σi
is the standard deviation of the stock specific shock ε˜i, which is a standard normal random
variable. The factor shock f˜ and the stock specific shock ε˜i are independent.
Stock i is thus characterized by three parameters, Ci, Bi, and σi. The macroeconomic
factor will ultimately give rise to the systematic risk in the economy, and Bi largely deter-
mines the loading of stock i on this risk. The stock specific shocks generate idiosyncratic
risks, and σi largely determines the magnitude of idiosyncratic volatility of stock i. Finally,
because of the short horizon between the two periods, the magnitude of the cash flow Ci
largely determines the market capitalization of stock i.
We assume that cross-sectionally (across i), logCi, Bi, and log σi follow normal distribu-
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tions. In addition, logCi and log σi are correlated:
corr[ logCi, log σi ] = ρ. (4)
A negative ρ will generate a negative correlation between size and idiosyncratic volatility in
the model, consistent with the empirical evidence. The distribution of Bi is independent of
logCi and log σi. As a result, in the model the CAPM beta varies essentially independently
from size or idiosyncratic volatility, and thus cannot explain the return patterns associated
with size or idiosyncratic volatility. The stock specific shocks are correlated, and corr[ ε˜i1, ε˜i2 ]
is drawn from a normal distribution.
Let Vi denote the time-0 present value of the time-1 random cash flow C˜i of stock i; Vi is
also firm size or market capitalization. The gross return is
R˜i =
Ci
Vi
(1 +BiσF f˜ + σiε˜i). (5)
The expected gross return is simply
Ri = E[ R˜i ] =
Ci
Vi
. (6)
It then follows that
R˜i = Ri(1 +BiσF f˜ + σiε˜i). (7)
The covariance between two stocks i1 and i2 is
cov[ R˜i1, R˜i2 ] = Ri1Ri2
(
Bi1Bi2σ
2
F + σi1σi2 cov[ ε˜i1, ε˜i2 ]
)
. (8)
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4.2 Under-diversified, mean-variance optimizing investors
The economy is populated with a large number of individual investors. A large literature
documents that individual investors hold under-diversified portfolios,12 and proposes numer-
ous explanations.13 To sharpen the focus of our study, we abstract from specific mechanisms
underlying investor under-diversification, and take this empirical regularity as given. In the
baseline model, similar to Levy (1978) and Merton (1987), we assign a small number of
random stocks to each investor. Moreover, as detailed below, we assign stocks so that the
model economy replicates the empirical relation between the number of investors and firm
size.
In the baseline model, investors have the same wealth, and each of them makes a small
number, M , of picks from the entire universe of stocks with replacement. The probability of
stock i being picked is
Pi ∝ Cλi eσpipii , pii ∼ N(0, 1), λ > 0. (9)
The probability is proportional to the magnitude of the cash flow raised to the power of
λ, and is also subject to a log-normal variation with σpi as the standard deviation. The
log-normal term represents factors that drive investors’ picks but are orthogonal to Ci.
The same stock can be picked more than once by an investor. With a large number of
stocks, duplication only occurs for stocks with very large Pi and in the portfolios of a tiny
fraction of investors. Most investors’ portfolios contain M different stocks.14
12See, among others, Blume and Friend (1975), Kelly (1995), Barber and Odean (2000), Polkovnichenko
(2005), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), and the survey in Campbell
(2006).
13See, among others, Brennan (1975), Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Bloomfield, Leftwich, and
Long (1977), Merton (1987), Odean (1999), Harvey and Siddique (2000), Shefrin and Statman (2000),
Polkovnichenko (2005), Barberis and Huang (2008), Cohen (2009), Liu (2009), and Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2010).
14As shown later, our calibration specifies a large number of investors, and as a result, all stocks are picked
by some investors.
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The total number of investors holding stock i is proportional to the probability Pi:
Ni ≈ const× Cλi eσpipii , (10)
or
logNi ≈ const + λ logCi + σpipii. (11)
Because the short horizon between the two periods in the model, the distribution of Ci
largely determines that of Vi. Hence, this stock picking scheme allows the model to replicate
the empirical relation reported earlier between CSHR and ME.
After picking stocks, each investor solves a mean-variance portfolio problem. For expo-
sitional clarity, we will suppress the investor index in the following. Let R denote the vector
of the expected gross returns of the stocks in an investor’s portfolio, and Σ be the covariance
matrix of the stock returns. The investor can also borrow or lend a risk-free asset, with the
gross risk-free rate Rf . Let ω denote the vector of the weights for the stocks. The investor
maximizes
(1−ω ′1)Rf +ω ′R − δ
2
ω ′Σω. (12)
Here, δ is a preference parameter that determines the investor’s mean-variance tradeoff.
Without any constraints, the first order condition with respect to ω
R −Rf1− δΣω = 0 (13)
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yields
ω =
1
δ
Σ−1(R −Rf1). (14)
If the investor is subject to constraints on shorting
ω > 0, (15)
or borrowing up to, e.g., 30% of the net worth of the portfolio,
ω ′1 ≤ 1.3, (16)
then the optimization is generally a quadratic programming problem.
4.3 Equilibrium
We set up the economy, the stocks, and the investors’ holdings, and then solve for the
equilibrium. We begin with an initial guess of expected stock returns. Using expected stock
returns, we compute market capitalization Vi. The sum of all Vi is the total wealth in the
economy, which is equally divided among the investors. Then we solve the portfolio problem
for each investor. For each stock, we sum up the wealth invested in the stock by all the
investors holding the stock. The total wealth invested in stock i, Wi, represents the demand,
while the supply is Vi. Hence, if Wi < Vi, or the demand is less than the supply, we increase
the expected return Ri, which induces investors holding stock i to allocate more of their
wealth to the stock. Conversely, if Wi > Vi, or the demand is more than the supply, we
decrease Ri, and as a result, investors holding stock i allocate less of their wealth to the
stock. In equilibrium, the demand equals the supply for all the stocks. When the markets
are clear for all the stocks, by the Walras law, borrowing and lending between investors at
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the risk-free rate also sum to 0.
With the solution of the equilibrium, the aggregate stock market return is
R˜M =
∑
i ViR˜i∑
i Vi
=
∑
i ViRi(1 +BiσF f˜ + σiε˜i)∑
i Vi
(17)
=
∑
iCi∑
i Vi
+
∑
iCiBi∑
i Vi
σF f˜ +
∑
iCiσiε˜i∑
i Vi
(18)
=
∑
iCi∑
i Vi
(
1 +
∑
iCiBi∑
iCi
σF f˜ +
∑
iCiσiε˜i∑
iCi
)
(19)
= RM(1 +BMσF f˜ + ε˜M), (20)
where the expected market return is
RM =
∑
iCi∑
i Vi
. (21)
The market return variance is
var[R˜M ] = R
2
M
(
B2Mσ
2
F + var[ ε˜M ]
)
. (22)
The covariance between the market return and the return of stock i is
cov[ R˜i, R˜M ] = RiRM
(
BiBMσ
2
F + σi cov[ ε˜i, ε˜M ]
)
. (23)
We can then compute the CAPM beta
βi =
cov[ R˜i, R˜M ]
var[ R˜M ]
, (24)
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and the idiosyncratic volatility
Hi =
√
var[Ri ]− β2i var[ R˜M ]. (25)
For the model, all variables are explicitly computed from the solution, while their empirical
counterparts are estimated from the real data.
4.4 Model parameters
We choose the model parameters so that the model economy replicates the salient properties
of the empirical data. In the baseline calibration, we set the number of stocks at 2000,15 and
the number of investors at 2×105. As surveyed in Campbell (2006), earlier studies find that
the number of stocks held by a typical household or individual investor is only one or two.
More recently, this number appears to increase to about four [Barber and Odean (2000) and
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)].16 In our baseline calibration, each investor makes four stock
picks, and we find that on average, 99% of investors end up holding four different stocks.
For the distribution of logCi, the mean is 5.01 and the standard deviation is 1.75. These
two parameters are chosen so that in the model the mean and the standard deviation of log Vi
match those of log(ME) of the firms in the empirical data. For the distribution of log σi, the
mean is 2.14 and the standard deviation is 0.65. These two parameters are chosen so that in
the model the mean and the standard deviation of logHi match those of log(IVOL) in the
empirical data. We set corr[ logCi, log σi ] to be -0.5 so that in the model corr[ log Vi, logHi ]
matches the observed negative correlation between log(ME) and log(IVOL).
The distribution of factor exposure, Bi, has a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of
15The number of the firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ varies from about 500 in 1926, to
about 3000 in 1967, to about 9000 in 1997, and to slightly less than 6000 in 2008.
16More specifically, in a sample of more than 62,000 household investors from a U.S. brokerage house,
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) show that more than 25% of the investor portfolios contain only one stock,
over half of the investor portfolios contain no more than three stocks, and less than 10% the investor portfolios
contain more than ten stocks.
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0.5. The correlations between stock specific shocks, corr[ εi1, εi2 ], are assigned with a mean
of 0 and and a standard deviation of 0.1. The model solutions indicate that the results are
robust to changes in these parameters.17
As discussed earlier, in the empirical data, the Fama-MacBeth regressions of log(CSHR)
on log(ME) suggest a roughly square-root dependence. Hence, we set λ = 0.5 so that the
number of investors on average increases with the square root of Ci in our model.
18 The
standard deviation σpi, characterizing the variation in the number of investors orthogonal to
Ci, is set to 1.3 so that the model matches the average R
2 of the regressions of log(CSHR)
on log(ME).
Finally, the standard deviation of the macroeconomic factor, σF , set to 0.055, is intended
for the model to match the monthly volatility of the aggregate stock market return. The
monthly gross risk-free rate Rf is set to 1.003. The preference parameter δ = 0.7, and for
parsimony, is assumed to be the same for all investors. These two parameters are chosen to
replicate the averages of the stock returns and the excess returns.
4.5 Model-implied results
The full empirical sample contains 1008 months, and we report the empirical results as
time-series averages. Accordingly, we simulate the model economy for 1000 times, and solve
for the equilibrium for each economy. From the solutions, we obtain directly an array of
variables, in particular expected returns Ri, firm values Vi, and idiosyncratic volatilities Hi.
We compute the averages of the model results over the 1000 equilibria.
We first compute the averages of key summary statistics over the 1000 equilibria and
compare with those of the empirical data. We find that, on average, the mean of log Vi
is 5.00, and the standard deviation is 1.75; the mean of logHi is 2.15, and the standard
17We obtain very similar results if we change the standard deviation of Bi or specify the stock specific
shocks as uncorrelated across firms.
18The model results are stronger if we set a smaller λ.
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deviation is 0.65; the mean of Ri − Rf is 0.90% per month; the correlation between log Vi
and logHi is -0.50. For the regressions of log number of investors on log size (logNi on log Vi),
the average slope is 0.50, and the average R2 is 0.31. The average market excess return is
0.60% per month, and the average market return volatility is 5.6% per month. These results
confirm that the calibrated model well replicates the key features of the empirical data.
Next, we investigate the relations between size, idiosyncratic volatility, and expected
return in the model, using the return regressions and portfolio sorting applied earlier to the
empirical data. We report the averages of the results over the 1000 equilibria of the simulated
economies and compare with the empirical results.
Table 10 presents the regressions of the expected excess returns of individual stocks.
Regressing the expected excess return Ri − Rf on size log Vi yields a negative coefficient.
Regressing Ri − Rf on idiosyncratic volatility logHi yields a positive coefficient. When
both variables are included, the coefficient for log Vi turns positive, while that for logHi
remains positive and become larger. These model-implied regression results well replicate
the patterns observed in the real data regressions.
Table 11 presents the expected excess returns of the stock portfolios. In Panel A, stocks
are sorted by size V into deciles of equal number of stocks,19 and the equal-weighted ex-
pected returns in excess of Rf are reported. The results indicate higher expected returns
for smaller stocks, consistent with the finding in the real data that small firms earn higher
returns than large firms. Panel B reports the equal-weighted expected returns for the deciles
sorted by idiosyncratic volatility H. The results indicate that expected return increases with
idiosyncratic volatility. This is consistent with the finding in the real data that stocks with
high idiosyncratic volatility earn high returns.
Finally, we apply the sequential sorting procedure: we sort the stocks first by idiosyncratic
volatility H into deciles, then for each H decile, sort stocks by size V into ten portfolios.
19There is no model counterpart to NYSE stocks so we simply form portfolios of equal number of stocks.
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To check the control for idiosyncratic volatility, Panel C reports the difference in median H
between the largest and the smallest V portfolios within each H decile. For each of H deciles
1 to 9, the difference in median H is slightly negative and no more than 1% in magnitude. For
H decile 10, the difference is about -11%. These results are quantitatively very close to the
corresponding empirical results presented in Table 7. Therefore, in both the empirical data
and the model equilibria, the control for idiosyncratic volatility is effective in idiosyncratic
volatility deciles 1 to 9, but poor in decile 10.
Panel D presents the equal-weighted expected excess returns of the 100 H-then-V sorted
portfolios. Within each of H deciles 1 to 9, the expected excess return increases with size —
large stocks earn higher returns than small stocks. The only exception is in the highest H
decile. Like the highest IVOL decile in the real data, the return spread between the highest
and the lowest size portfolios is negative in the highest H decile.
Panel E of Table 11 presents the value-weighted expected excess return spreads. The
results are qualitatively the same as those based on equal-weighted returns, though somewhat
smaller in magnitudes. All these return patterns are similarly observed in the real data.
In our model, the CAPM beta varies independently from size and idiosyncratic volatility
in the cross section. Therefore, the relations between return, size, and idiosyncratic volatility
reported above are not driven by variations in the CAPM beta. For example, if we use the
CAPM beta adjusted expected returns to compute the portfolio return spreads, the results
are very close to those in Table 11. If we include the CAPM beta as a regressor in the return
regressions, the coefficients on size and idiosyncratic volatility change very little.
Altogether, in the model equilibria, unconditionally there is a negative size-return rela-
tion, and a positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return. Most importantly,
after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility, the relation between size and return becomes
positive. The model is well capable of generating the qualitative patterns of the empirical
results, while the quantitative magnitudes are smaller than those in the real data. Given the
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stylized nature of the model, its quantitative performance is still remarkable.
4.6 Counterfactual experiments
An advantage of the model is that it allows us to make counterfactual changes on the inputs
to the model and examine the impact on the model results. In doing so, we can identify the
underlying economic mechanisms that drive the particular model results.
Our model is based on three key empirical regularities — the decreasing size-scaled
number of investors, the negative correlation between size and idiosyncratic volatility, and
investor under-diversification. Thus, we conduct a few experiments and make counterfactual
changes on each of the three features, one at a time. The results from these experiments
are presented in Table 12. To facilitate comparison, the results for the baseline model are
reproduced in line 0 of Table 12.
In the first experiment, we change λ to 1, so that the number of investors increases
linearly with size, or equivalently, the size-scaled number of investors is the same for all
stocks. Everything else remains the same. As reported in line 1 of Table 12, the size-
return relation conditional on idiosyncratic volatility exhibits striking differences from the
baseline model. In the baseline model (line 0), the relation is positive. When the number
of investors is set to grow linearly with firm size, the relation becomes largely flat. In the
return regression on both size (log Vi) and idiosyncratic volatility (logHi), the slope on log Vi
is essentially zero. In the portfolio return results, within each of H deciles 1 to 9 (where
the control for H is effective), the return spreads between the largest and the smallest size
portfolios are very close to zero.
In the second experiment, we change ρ to 0, so that size and idiosyncratic volatility
vary independently across firms. Everything else remains the same, including λ = 0.5. The
results are reported in line 2 of Table 12. Similar to the baseline model, this experiment also
generates a positive size-return relation conditional on idiosyncratic volatility. Different from
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the baseline model, the relation between size and return is positive even without controlling
for idiosyncratic volatility. As a matter of fact, since log Vi and logHi are uncorrelated, the
slope coefficients for them are essentially the same in the return regressions on log Vi and
logHi separately and jointly.
The results from the two experiments imply that the positive size-return relation is driven
by the decreasing size-scaled number of investors, while the unconditional negative size-return
relation is due to the negative correlation between size and idiosyncratic volatility. What is
common across the baseline, the first experiment (λ = 1), and the second experiment (ρ = 0)
is the increasing expected return in idiosyncratic volatility. This suggests that the positive
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return is driven by investor under-diversification.
We conduct two additional experiments to further investigate the role of investor under-
diversification. Investors hold four stocks in the baseline model. In line 3, we let investors
hold only three stocks; in line 4, they hold ten stocks. As the number of stocks increases from
three to four and then to ten, investors become more diversified, and all the relations weaken
in magnitude: the size-return relation conditional on idiosyncratic volatility becomes less
positive; the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return becomes less positive; the
unconditional size-return relation becomes less negative. These results suggest a critical role
of investor under-diversification in driving the relations between size, idiosyncratic volatility,
and return.
To summarize, our results from the counterfactual experiments suggest the following
economic intuition. First, because large stocks, relative to their size, attract fewer investors,
they have to offer higher expected returns to induce their investors to allocate more of their
wealth. This gives rise to the positive size-return relation. Second, when investors are under-
diversified, they demand compensation for bearing idiosyncratic risk, resulting in the positive
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and expected return. Finally, large (small) stocks
tend to have low (high) idiosyncratic volatilities. This negative correlation between size and
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idiosyncratic volatility generates a negative link between size and return, and quantitatively,
it more than offsets the positive link driven by the decreasing number of investors. As a
result, we observe an unconditional negative relation.
In the first experiment (λ = 1), the number of investors is proportional to size. Relative
to small firms, large firms do not need to offer higher expected returns to attract investor
wealth. Hence, the size-return relation conditional on idiosyncratic volatility is flat. However,
the negative link between size and return still exists due to the negative correlation between
size and idiosyncratic volatility. As a result, small stocks exhibit high returns, and this is
simply and wholly due to their large idiosyncratic volatilities.20
In the second experiment (ρ = 0), the correlation between size and idiosyncratic volatility
becomes zero. This shuts down the negative link between size and return via idiosyncratic
volatility. Meanwhile, λ = 0.5, the size-scaled number of investors decreases with size. This
generates a positive relation between size and return, both with and without the control for
idiosyncratic volatility.
4.7 Additional robustness checks
We study several additional variants of the model to check the robustness of the model
implications.
In our baseline model, investors solve an unconstrained mean-variance portfolio optimiza-
tion. The portfolio weights can be negative: investors can short stocks and borrow at the
risk-free rate. In reality, investors often face constraints on shorting stocks and borrowing.
We investigate two variants of the model that impose these restrictions. Line 5 in Table
12 presents the results when investors are not allowed to short stocks, and line 6 explores
the consequences of imposing a constraint that investors cannot borrow more than 30% of
20The results in line 1 also indicate a negative expected return spread across the size portfolios in the
highest H decile. This is due to the poor control for H which yields a negative H spread in this decile.
29
the net worth of their portfolios. With constraints, the size-return relation conditional on
idiosyncratic volatility becomes more positive, and the unconditional size-return relation be-
comes somewhat less negative. In addition, the unconditional idiosyncratic volatility-return
relation becomes less positive than that in the baseline model.
Another assumption we make for parsimony in the baseline model is that all investors
have equal wealth. In a variant of the model, we divide the investors into two equal-numbered
groups of 100,000 investors. Each investor in the first group is endowed with three times as
much wealth as that of an investor in the second group. Consistent with the empirical evi-
dence in Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) that larger stock portfolios by individual households
are more diversified, each investor of the first group picks six stocks, while each investor of
the second group picks two stocks. The results from this variant are very close to those of
the baseline model. In yet another variant, we allocate 50,000 investors to the first, wealth-
ier group, and the remaining 150,000 to the second group. The results are quantitatively
stronger than those of the baseline model.
In addition, we increase the number of stocks to 4000, or the number of investors to
4 × 105. The model results of these two variants are very close to those of the baseline
model.
4.8 Large and diversified funds
The baseline model focuses on under-diversified individual investors. This is consistent with
the observation that such investors play a dominant role in the US stock market for a large
part of our sample period. In recent decades, institutional investors are playing a more
and more important role in the stock market. The total number of institutional investors
as reported in the 13f institutional holding dataset has risen from 525 to 3100 during the
period 1980–2008. The percentage of the total market capitalization held by institutional
investors also increases from 31% to 68%, with a time-series average of 50%. The median
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(mean) number of stocks held by an institutional investor reduces from 125 to 70 (increases
from 165 to 265) during the same period. The stock portfolios of typical institutions are
large in value and contain many stocks, and thus are likely diversified. A growing number
of individual investors hold stocks through these institutions and thus become diversified.
To explore the implications of this development, we consider a parsimonious setup with
two groups of individual investors: the first group remain under-diversified, each holding
four individual stocks; the second group hold stocks through 1000 large and diversified
institutions, which we call mutual funds. As a result, our model accommodates diversified
individual investors.21
The number of under-diversified individual investors is kept at 2 × 105. We also double
the number of stocks to 4000. This is consistent with the trend of growing total number of
stocks in the empirical data. Half of the total stock market wealth is held by under-diversified
individual investors, and the other half under the management of mutual funds. Hence, in
terms of the value of stock holdings, each mutual fund is as large as 200 under-diversified
individual investors. Each mutual fund makes 50 stock picks. Again, for parsimony, we as-
sume that mutual funds pick stocks with a probability following the square-root dependence
on the cash flow. This is the same as that for under-diversified individual investors. On the
other hand, the random variation terms in the probabilities representing the components
orthogonal to firm size are independent between mutual funds and under-diversified individ-
ual investors.22 Further, we assume that mutual funds are also mean-variance optimizing.
21In this parsimonious setup, under-diversified individual investors do not invest in mutual funds. This
simplifies the numerical solution of the equilibrium. Specifically, in this setup, for both under-diversified
individual investors and mutual funds, portfolio weights depend on the expected returns and the covariances
of the stocks. If under-diversified individual investors also invest in mutual funds, then these investors’
portfolio weights also depend on the expected returns and the covariances of mutual funds, which, in turn,
depend on mutual funds’ portfolio weights. We find that this additional layer of dependence substantially
slows down the convergence of the numerical solution.
22The results are similar if the random variation terms are the same for mutual funds and under-diversified
individual investors.
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Since institutional investors are usually restricted from shorting or borrowing,23 we impose
the restrictions of no shorting and borrowing on the mutual funds in our model. The model
solution indicates that mutual funds on average put positive weights in about 23 different
stocks.
Overall, we make a number of simplifying assumptions on the behavior of the mutual
funds in our model. Our focus is how the results change when both small, under-diversified
individual investors and large institutions representing diversified individual investors partic-
ipate in the stock market. Line 7 in Table 12 presents the results. Compared to the baseline
model, the qualitative patterns remain the same under this setup. On the other hand, all
the relations become smaller in magnitude: the unconditional size effect is less negative;
the unconditional idiosyncratic volatility effect is less positive; the return spreads between
the largest and the smallest V portfolios for H deciles 1 to 9 are less positive than those
of the baseline model. These changes from the baseline model due to the participation of
mutual funds are anticipated, as they confirm investor under-diversification as the economic
driving force of the relations between size, idiosyncratic volatility, and return. In addition,
these changes from the baseline model due to the participation of mutual funds are broadly
consistent with the variations in the empirical results from the early period 1926:07–1967:12
to the later period 1968:01–2009:12. Institutional investors play a more important role in
the stock market in the later period.
5 Concluding remarks
In this study, we document robust empirical evidence that, after controlling for idiosyncratic
volatility, there is a positive relation between size and return. We explain this positive rela-
tion, and reconcile it with the widely documented negative relation without the control for
23Under federal law, mutual funds cannot take on debt of more than a third of their assets.
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idiosyncratic volatility. We demonstrate the economic intuition in a parsimonious equilib-
rium model. Specifically, some individual investors are under-diversified, and large stocks,
relative to their size, are held by fewer investors. To clear the markets, large stocks have to
offer higher expected returns to induce the investors to allocate more of their wealth, giving
rise to the positive size-return relation. The traditional negative relation is the result of
the failure to control for idiosyncratic volatility. This generates a downward omitted vari-
able bias because idiosyncratic volatility is negatively related to size and, in the presence of
investor under-diversification, positively related to return.
The model in our study reveals important insights that do not readily transpire in the
factor pricing framework. Indeed, the economic intuition underlying the relations between
size, idiosyncratic volatility, and return is difficult to explain with factor pricing models.
First, the positive size-return relation in our model is not driven by variations in either
systematic risk or idiosyncratic risk.24 Second, idiosyncratic volatility is associated with
high returns in our model because it contributes to the risk of under-diversified portfolios.
As investors hold a small number of different stocks, the same stock contributes varying
amount of risk to different investor portfolios. This is difficult to fit into factor pricing
models, which assume that a stock has the same risk to all investors.
Our model is based on three empirical regularities. We take them as inputs to our
model. In particular, following Levy (1978) and Merton (1987), we assign under-diversified
portfolios to investors and investigate the asset pricing implications. It would be interesting
to incorporate potential mechanisms into the model so that these empirical regularities (in
particular, investor under-diversification and the decreasing size-scaled number of investors)
could arise endogenously. Such an extension is computationally challenging and merits a
separate study in the future. In our current paper, we have investigated a few model variants
24In the baseline model, size and the CAPM beta are uncorrelated. In one of the counterfactual exper-
iments, we further set zero correlation between size and idiosyncratic volatility. The positive size-return
relation arises in both scenarios.
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— we change the number of stocks in investor portfolios, divide investors into two groups
holding different numbers of stocks, or introduce large and diversified mutual funds — and
find similar results. While these variants do not incorporate the endogeneity directly, they
suggest that the model results are robust to different scenarios of investor portfolio selections.
Following the classical CAPM literature, we employ a two-period setup for our model.
This static setup precludes time-varying returns and volatilities. A dynamic setup could
lead to new and interesting implications.25 To sharpen the focus of this paper, we leave the
extension to future research.
Appendix: Omitted variable bias
For expositional clarity, we suppress the time and firm subscripts. In
XRET = const + b1 log(ME) + b2 log(IVOL) + u, (26)
the empirical results suggest that
b1 > 0, b2 > 0, corr[ log(ME), log(IVOL) ] < 0. (27)
Then, regressing XRET on log(ME) only, with log(IVOL) as the omitted variable,
XRET = const + b′1 log(ME) + u1, (28)
we obtain a slope of
b′1 =
cov[ XRET, log(ME) ]
var[ log(ME) ]
(29)
=
b1 var[ log(ME) ] + b2 cov[ log(IVOL), log(ME) ]
var[ log(ME) ]
(30)
= b1 + b2 corr[ log(ME), log(IVOL) ]
std[ log(IVOL) ]
std[ log(ME) ]
. (31)
25For example, Shapiro (2002) studies investor recognition in an intertemporal setting and reveals new
insights.
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The two terms in the above suggest two channels that drive the unconditional relation
between size and return. The first channel is the positive size-return relation (b1 > 0). In
the second channel, size is negatively correlated with idiosyncratic volatility, which, in turn,
is positively associated with return (b2 > 0). The second channel represents the omitted
variable bias.
Regressing XRET on log(IVOL) only, with log(ME) as the omitted variable,
XRET = const + b′2 log(IVOL) + u2, (32)
we obtain a slope of
b′2 =
cov[XRET, log(IVOL) ]
var[ log(IVOL) ]
(33)
=
b1 cov[ log(ME), log(IVOL) ] + b2 var[ log(IVOL) ]
var[ log(IVOL) ]
(34)
= b2 + b1 corr[ log(ME), log(IVOL) ]
std[ log(ME) ]
std[ log(IVOL) ]
. (35)
There are also two channels driving the unconditional relation between idiosyncratic volatility
and return. The first channel is the positive relation (b2 > 0). In the second channel,
idiosyncratic volatility is negatively related to size, which, in turn, is positively associated
with return (b1 > 0). The second channel represents the omitted variable bias.
The negative corr[ log(ME), log(IVOL) ] implies that the second channels counteract the
first channels — i.e., the biases are downward. Hence, b′1 < b1 and b
′
2 < b2. Further, b
′
1 < 0
implies b′2 > 0. More specifically, b
′
1 < 0 suggests that
b1
b2
<
(
− corr[ log(ME), log(IVOL) ]
)std[ log(IVOL) ]
std[ log(ME) ]
. (36)
This implies that, as the magnitude of the correlation coefficient is smaller than 1,
b1
b2
<
1(
− corr[ log(ME), log(IVOL) ]
) std[ log(IVOL) ]
std[ log(ME) ]
, (37)
which implies b′2 > 0.
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Table 1: Time-series averages of cross-sectional descriptive statistics of the sample
This table reports the time-series averages of the descriptive statistics of the empirical data variables. We use log()
to denote natural logarithm.
In Panel A, we begin with all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during the period of January
1926–December 2009, and require that monthly return (RET), end-of-previous-month market capitalization (ME),
and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) are available. There are 3,520,244 firm-month observations in total. RET is the
monthly raw return in percentage. XRET is the monthly return in excess of the one-month T-bill rate. ME is in
millions of dollars, and adjusted by the Consumer Price Index to the dollars of December 2000. IVOL is estimated each
month for each stock, as described in Section 2. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, we delete monthly returns
over 300% and winsorize the top and bottom 0.5% of IVOL estimates in each month. We evaluate the descriptive
statistics for each month, and report the time-series averages.
In Panel B, CSHR is the number of common shareholders in thousands. Compustat reports this data item since
fiscal year 1975. The statistics for this variable is based on 201,062 firm-year observations for the period 1975–2009.
We evaluate the descriptive statistics for each year, and report the time-series averages.
Variable Mean Std Dev Skewness Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3
Panel A: Monthly data, 1926:01–2009:12
RET (%) 1.23 12.55 1.69 -5.28 0.25 6.30
XRET (%) 0.93 12.55 1.69 -5.58 -0.05 6.00
ME ($ million) 978.77 4488.89 15.17 52.83 154.46 562.34
IVOL (%) 11.39 8.60 2.23 5.87 8.99 14.02
log(ME) 5.00 1.76 0.31 3.76 4.87 6.13
log(IVOL) 2.15 0.63 0.14 1.72 2.14 2.56
Panel B: Annual data, 1975–2009
CSHR (thousand) 15.61 323.14 35.36 0.62 1.55 4.80
log(CSHR) 0.53 1.72 0.41 -0.64 0.36 1.53
40
Table 2: Time-series averages of cross-sectional simple correlations
The sample is monthly for the period of January 1926–December 2009. We
use log() to denote natural logarithm.
In each month, we compute the correlations between monthly return (RET),
end-of-previous-month market capitalization (ME), and idiosyncratic volatility
(IVOL). This table presents the time-series averages of the correlations. The
t-statistics in the parentheses are the time-series averages of the correlations
divided by the corresponding time-series standard errors.
log(ME) log(IVOL)
RET -0.01 (-2.01) 0.09 ( 12.55)
log(ME) -0.52 (-113.1)
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Table 3: Fama-MacBeth regressions of excess returns
The sample is monthly for the period of January 1926–December 2009. We use
log() to denote natural logarithm.
In each month we run cross-sectional regressions. XRET is the percentage monthly
return in excess of the one-month T-bill rate, ME is end-of-previous-month market
capitalization, and IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility.
We report the results for the full sample period of January 1926–December 2009
and separately for two subperiods: the early period 1926:01–1967:12 and the later
period 1968:01–2009:12. For each sample period, we report the time-series averages
of the slope coefficients and the R2 values. The t-statistics in the parentheses are the
time-series averages of the slopes divided by the corresponding time-series standard
errors. For the full sample period, there are a total of 1007 monthly regressions, with
an average of 3495 firms per month. For the early subperiod, there are a total of 503
monthly regressions, with an average of 1017 firms per month. For the later subperiod,
there are a total of 504 monthly regressions, with an average of 5966 firms per month.
Time-series averages
Slope on
log(ME)
Slope on
log(IVOL)
R2 (%)
Full sample: 1926:01–2009:12
-0.18 (-4.39) 1.95
2.14 (12.48) 5.48
0.33 (12.85) 2.66 (15.29) 6.56
Early period: 1926:01–1967:12
-0.24 (-3.40) 2.65
2.44 ( 9.47) 6.52
0.46 (12.32) 3.22 (12.31) 7.91
Later period: 1968:01–2009:12
-0.12 (-2.85) 1.25
1.83 ( 8.15) 4.45
0.20 ( 5.85) 2.09 ( 9.26) 5.21
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Table 4: Fama-MacBeth regressions of excess returns with additional control variables in the period of 1968:01–2009:12
The sample is monthly for the period of 1968:01–2009:12. We use log() to denote natural logarithm.
In each month we run cross-sectional regressions. XRET is the percentage monthly return in excess of the one-month T-bill
rate, ME is end-of-previous-month market capitalization, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, B/M is book-to-market equity, TURN
is the average turnover in the past 36 months, CVTURN is the coefficient variation of the past 36-month turnovers, RETt−1
is the preceding month return, and RETt−7,t−2 is the compound gross return of the previous 6 months (skipping the preceding
month).
We report the time-series averages of the slope coefficients and the R2 values. The t-statistics in the parentheses are the
time-series averages of the slopes divided by the corresponding time-series standard errors.
Time-series averages
Dependent
variable
Slope on
log(ME)
Slope on
log(IVOL)
Slope on
log(B/M)
Slope on
log(TURN)
Slope on
log(CVTURN)
Slope on
RETt−1
Slope on
RETt−7,t−2
R2
(%)
XRET -0.22 (-5.65) 0.14 (2.78) -0.01 (-0.15) -0.38 (-4.70) -0.06 (-12.65) 0.56 (2.19) 7.67
XRET 0.19 ( 6.38) 2.56 (13.10) 0.36 (7.90) -0.45 (-7.52) -0.63 (-8.34) -0.06 (-15.00) 0.72 (3.16) 10.66
log(100+XRET)*100 0.16 ( 5.65) 1.26 ( 6.72) 0.39 (8.93) -0.51 (-8.45) -0.63 (-8.49) -0.06 (-15.98) 0.80 (3.74) 10.57
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Table 5: Time-series averages of excess returns for portfolios sorted by size
The sample is monthly for the period of January 1926–December 2009. In each month we sort stocks into 10
portfolios by end-of-previous-month market capitalization (ME). The breaking points are based on the ME of NYSE
stocks only.
In each month, for each ME portfolio, we compute the equal- and value-weighted returns in excess of the one-month
T-bill rate. We report the time-series averages of the portfolio excess returns (XRET) for the full sample period of
January 1926–December 2009 and separately for three subperiods: the early period 1926:01–1967:12, the later period
1968:01–2009:12, and the latest period 1982:01–2009:12, which is after the documentation of the size effect in Banz
(1981) and Reinganum (1981). FF alphas are the intercepts estimated from the time-series regressions of the portfolio
return spreads on the Fama-French three factors.
ME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ME 10-1 FF
XRET (%) Small Large Spread (t-stat) alpha (t-stat)
Full sample: 1926:01–2009:12
EW 1.62 0.99 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.58 -1.04 (-4.12) -0.33 (-2.36)
VW 1.28 0.98 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.57 -0.72 (-2.92) 0.02 ( 0.20)
Early period: 1926:01–1967:12
EW 2.46 1.49 1.20 1.18 1.10 1.10 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.75 -1.71 (-3.80) -0.87 (-4.23)
VW 2.10 1.47 1.21 1.17 1.08 1.09 1.01 0.97 0.90 0.77 -1.33 (-3.03) -0.45 (-2.51)
Later period: 1968:01–2009:12
EW 0.78 0.50 0.45 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.41 -0.38 (-1.64) -0.05 (-0.31)
VW 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.36 -0.11 (-0.49) 0.28 ( 2.18)
Latest period: 1982:01–2009:12
EW 0.76 0.54 0.56 0.62 0.67 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.63 -0.13 (-0.49) -0.04 (-0.17)
VW 0.42 0.54 0.56 0.62 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.57 0.14 ( 0.60) 0.32 ( 1.88)
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Table 6: Time-series averages of excess returns for portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic volatility
The sample is monthly for the period of January 1926–December 2009. In each month we sort stocks into 10
portfolios by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). The breaking points are based on the IVOL of NYSE stocks only.
In each month, for each IVOL portfolio, we compute the equal- and value-weighted returns in excess of the one-
month T-bill rate. We report the time-series averages of the portfolio excess returns (XRET) for the full sample period
of January 1926–December 2009 and separately for two subperiods: the early period 1926:01–1967:12 and the later
period 1968:01–2009:12. FF alphas are the intercepts estimated from the time-series regressions of the portfolio return
spreads on the Fama-French three factors.
IVOL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 IVOL 10-1 FF
XRET (%) Low High Spread (t-stat) alpha (t-stat)
Full sample: 1926:01–2009:12
EW 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.30 0.52 0.74 1.22 3.80 3.78 (10.81) 2.67 (14.14)
VW 0.32 0.45 0.51 0.59 0.84 0.98 1.18 1.59 1.93 2.84 2.52 ( 7.83) 1.83 ( 7.39)
Early period: 1926:01–1967:12
EW 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.54 0.67 1.04 1.46 2.23 4.92 4.76 (8.47) 3.49 (13.31)
VW 0.38 0.52 0.59 0.75 1.10 1.36 1.72 2.45 3.20 4.61 4.22 (9.08) 3.54 ( 9.24)
Later period: 1968:01–2009:12
EW -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.21 2.69 2.80 (6.78) 2.10 (8.94)
VW 0.25 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.66 1.07 0.82 (1.89) 0.25 (0.92)
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Table 7: Characteristics of IVOL-then-ME sorted portfolios
The sample is monthly for the period of January 1926–December 2009.
In each month we first sort stocks into 10 portfolios by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) of the current month, and then sort
the stocks in each IVOL decile into 10 portfolios by end-of-previous-month market capitalization (ME). Both steps of sorting are
based on the breaking points of NYSE stocks only.
In each month, for each IVOL*ME portfolio, we compute the median ME and the median IVOL of the stocks in the portfolio.
We report the time-series averages of the portfolio characteristics.
ME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
IVOL Small Large Spread
Panel A: Time-series averages of median ME ($ millions)
1 Low 64.21 165.83 282.03 435.13 681.18 1047.50 1595.73 2472.88 4277.78 13326.83 13262.61
2 57.32 145.88 238.00 362.74 552.46 859.65 1337.07 2116.78 3767.39 10502.64 10445.32
3 52.23 131.60 222.00 348.06 522.34 789.48 1205.56 1939.82 3526.18 9335.60 9283.37
4 47.21 123.32 205.88 314.38 465.50 689.06 1048.80 1676.94 3091.49 8180.19 8132.98
5 42.59 112.11 184.09 275.58 398.64 578.96 866.79 1377.51 2560.71 7016.71 6974.12
6 37.81 98.39 159.26 235.73 337.71 483.77 711.00 1123.80 2058.26 5812.28 5774.47
7 32.49 84.30 134.14 196.03 276.13 390.18 567.42 885.44 1599.26 4487.97 4455.48
8 27.61 70.03 110.26 158.97 221.91 309.30 441.67 676.41 1208.01 3324.69 3297.09
9 21.47 53.43 83.19 119.59 165.42 227.47 319.87 480.96 839.15 2280.49 2259.02
10 High 10.66 27.33 43.48 63.42 89.97 125.97 178.64 268.17 460.09 1250.52 1239.87
Panel B: Time-series averages of median IVOL (%)
1 Low 3.07 3.11 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.13 3.10 3.04 -0.03
2 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.36 4.36 4.37 4.37 4.36 4.33 4.32 -0.06
3 5.30 5.30 5.28 5.29 5.28 5.28 5.27 5.27 5.25 5.24 -0.05
4 6.18 6.18 6.17 6.17 6.16 6.15 6.15 6.14 6.14 6.13 -0.05
5 7.12 7.12 7.11 7.09 7.10 7.08 7.08 7.07 7.07 7.04 -0.08
6 8.21 8.18 8.18 8.16 8.17 8.16 8.15 8.15 8.12 8.09 -0.12
7 9.56 9.52 9.52 9.49 9.47 9.47 9.47 9.44 9.43 9.41 -0.15
8 11.41 11.35 11.33 11.31 11.28 11.24 11.22 11.20 11.15 11.15 -0.27
9 14.56 14.44 14.34 14.25 14.20 14.18 14.04 14.03 13.96 13.92 -0.64
10 High 30.13 24.71 23.23 22.50 21.68 21.31 20.76 20.44 20.18 20.11 -10.02
46
Table 8: Time-series averages of the excess returns of IVOL-then-ME sorted portfolios
The sample is monthly for the period of January 1926–December 2009.
In each month we first sort stocks into 10 portfolios by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) of the current month, and then sort
the stocks in each IVOL decile into 10 portfolios by end-of-previous-month market capitalization (ME). Both steps of sorting are
based on the breaking points of NYSE stocks only.
In each month, for each IVOL*ME portfolio, we compute the equal- and value-weighted returns in excess of the one-month
T-bill rate. Panel A reports the time-series averages of the portfolio excess returns (XRET) for the full sample period of January
1926–December 2009. FF alphas are the intercepts estimated from the time-series regressions of the portfolio return spreads on
the Fama-French three factors. Panel B reports the time-series averages of the excess return spreads between the largest and the
smallest ME portfolios within each of the 10 IVOL deciles for two subperiods: the early period 1926:01–1967:12 and the later
period 1968:01–2009:12.
47
Table 8: continued.
Panel A: Time-series averages of portfolio excess returns
ME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ME 10-1 FF
IVOL Small Large Spread (t-stat) alpha (t-stat)
Full sample: 1926:01–2009:12. XRET, EW (%)
1 Low -0.28 -0.11 -0.03 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.35 0.64 ( 6.03) 0.39 ( 5.67)
2 -0.48 -0.15 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.49 0.97 ( 8.06) 0.75 ( 8.68)
3 -0.68 -0.22 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.55 0.52 1.21 ( 9.28) 0.99 (10.36)
4 -0.68 -0.18 -0.04 0.14 0.29 0.33 0.43 0.72 0.69 0.69 1.37 (10.48) 1.24 (12.86)
5 -0.78 -0.03 0.08 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.57 0.78 0.95 0.99 1.77 (11.86) 1.72 (14.37)
6 -0.80 -0.14 0.21 0.43 0.52 0.67 0.94 0.96 1.03 1.19 1.99 (12.66) 1.80 (13.71)
7 -0.57 0.00 0.40 0.76 0.77 1.04 1.16 1.30 1.43 1.46 2.02 (11.93) 2.08 (13.78)
8 -0.60 0.13 0.51 0.84 1.04 1.51 1.64 1.74 1.84 1.84 2.45 (13.15) 2.54 (15.62)
9 -0.14 0.87 1.14 1.31 1.77 1.91 1.84 2.15 2.36 2.46 2.60 (10.77) 2.77 (12.78)
10 High 4.95 3.76 3.43 3.74 3.48 3.33 3.29 3.32 3.21 3.04 -1.91 (-4.38) -1.38 (-3.42)
Full sample: 1926:01–2009:12. XRET, VW (%)
1 Low -0.23 -0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.40 0.63 ( 6.20) 0.44 ( 6.17)
2 -0.38 -0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.43 0.55 0.93 ( 7.59) 0.74 ( 8.01)
3 -0.62 -0.22 0.03 0.13 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.41 0.54 0.61 1.23 ( 9.25) 1.05 ( 9.98)
4 -0.55 -0.18 -0.03 0.14 0.29 0.33 0.44 0.73 0.70 0.68 1.23 ( 9.19) 1.20 (11.55)
5 -0.65 0.00 0.08 0.41 0.48 0.58 0.58 0.77 0.95 0.99 1.63 ( 9.78) 1.67 (11.64)
6 -0.63 -0.12 0.22 0.44 0.52 0.66 0.94 0.97 1.03 1.15 1.77 (10.74) 1.71 (11.74)
7 -0.48 0.03 0.41 0.78 0.79 1.04 1.16 1.31 1.44 1.34 1.82 ( 8.65) 2.00 (10.54)
8 -0.43 0.15 0.51 0.85 1.06 1.52 1.64 1.73 1.83 1.75 2.19 (10.79) 2.34 (12.78)
9 0.04 0.90 1.15 1.32 1.77 1.91 1.81 2.18 2.36 2.13 2.09 ( 7.74) 2.43 (10.03)
10 High 4.36 3.76 3.47 3.74 3.48 3.35 3.28 3.31 3.22 2.56 -1.80 (-3.84) -1.22 (-2.84)
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Table 8: continued.
Panel B: Time-series averages of excess return spreads between ME 10 and 1 portfolios within each IVOL decile
IVOL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ME 10-1 Low High
Early period: 1926:01–1967:12. XRET (%)
EW 0.54 0.89 1.18 1.43 1.84 2.30 2.23 2.97 3.30 -0.51
(t-stat) (3.10) (4.49) (5.45) (6.73) (7.32) (8.63) (7.92) (9.50) (7.85) (-0.67)
VW 0.60 0.95 1.39 1.45 1.90 2.22 2.26 2.96 3.20 -0.72
(t-stat) (3.75) (4.70) (6.36) (6.70) (6.57) (8.09) (6.17) (8.76) (6.77) (-0.87)
Later period: 1968:01–2009:12. XRET (%)
EW 0.73 1.04 1.24 1.30 1.70 1.68 1.81 1.92 1.90 -3.31
(t-stat) (6.16) (7.72) (8.50) (8.61) (10.49) (10.14) (9.65) (9.64) (8.14) (-8.28)
VW 0.67 0.92 1.07 1.02 1.37 1.33 1.37 1.42 0.98 -2.87
(t-stat) (5.23) (6.51) (7.07) (6.41) (8.16) (7.28) (6.73) (6.46) (3.89) (-6.59)
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Table 9: Number of shareholders and market capitalization
The sample is annual for the period of 1975–2009. We use log() to denote
natural logarithm.
In each year, we compute the correlation between log fiscal-year-end market
capitalization, log(ME), and log number of common shareholders, log(CSHR).
Panel A reports the time-series average of the correlations. The t-statistic in the
parentheses is the time-series average of the correlations divided by the corre-
sponding time-series standard error.
In each year, we regress log(CSHR) on log(ME). Panel B reports the time-
series averages of the slope coefficients and the R2 values from these regressions.
The t-statistic in the parentheses is the time-series average of the slopes divided
by the corresponding time-series standard error. There are a total of 35 yearly
regressions, with an average of 5743 firms per year.
Panel A: Time-series average of cross-sectional simple correlations (t-stat)
log(ME)
log(CSHR) 0.57 (27.0)
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regressions
Time-series averages
Slope on log(ME) R2 (%)
0.42 (30.1) 33.9
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Table 10: Regressions of expected excess returns in the baseline model
This table reports the regressions of the expected excess returns for individ-
ual stocks in the baseline model. We use log to denote natural logarithm. The
independent variable is the expected excess return Ri−Rf in percentage. The
regressors are size log Vi and idiosyncratic volatility logHi. Here, i is the firm
subscript. The coefficients (t-statistics) and R2 are averages across 1000 simula-
tions.
Slope on log Vi Slope on logHi R
2(%)
-0.092 (-4.53) 1.04
0.922 (18.6) 14.9
0.112 ( 5.25) 1.072 (18.9) 16.0
51
Table 11: Portfolio expected excess returns in the baseline model
This table reports the portfolio sorting results for the baseline model. All results are averages across 1000 simula-
tions.
In Panels A, B, and D, the portfolio expected excess returns are equal-weighted and in excess of the risk-free rate
Rf . In Panel A, stocks are sorted by size V into deciles. In Panel B, stocks are sorted by idiosyncratic volatility H
into deciles. In Panels C and D, stocks are first sorted into H deciles, and then, within each H decile, sorted into V
deciles. Panel C presents the difference in median H between the largest and the smallest V portfolios within each H
decile. Panel D presents the equal-weighted expected excess returns of the 100 H-then-V sorted portfolios. Panel E
presents the value-weighted expected excess return spreads.
Panel A: V portfolio expected excess returns (%)
V 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 V 10-1
Small Large Spread
EW 1.21 0.99 0.87 0.78 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.53 -0.68
Panel B: H portfolio expected excess returns (%)
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 H 10-1
Low High Spread
EW 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.43 0.52 0.70 0.98 1.51 2.85 2.66
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Table 11: continued
Panel C: Difference in median H of V 10 and V 1 (%)
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low High
-0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -0.25 -0.58 -0.98 -11.03
Panel D: H*V portfolio expected excess returns, EW (%)
V 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 V 10-1
H Small Large Spread
1 Low 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.07
2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.12
3 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.16
4 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.46 0.24
5 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.65 0.37
6 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.61 0.70 0.83 0.50
7 0.45 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.79 0.91 1.18 0.73
8 0.64 0.69 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.98 1.15 1.37 1.58 0.94
9 1.01 1.09 1.18 1.27 1.36 1.42 1.52 1.76 1.99 2.49 1.48
10 High 3.88 2.93 2.62 2.44 2.41 2.39 2.47 2.71 2.96 3.14 -0.74
Panel E: Portfolio expected excess return spreads, VW (%)
V H V 10-1 within each H decile
10-1 10-1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.59 1.66 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.34 0.47 0.68 0.89 1.42 -0.34
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Table 12: Variants of the baseline model
This table reports the results for different variants of the baseline model. All results are averages across 1000
simulations.
In the “Regressions” column, the four numbers in each line report the slope coefficients from the cross-sectional
regressions of the expected excess return Ri−Rf in percentage on log Vi only, on logHi only, and on both. We use log
to denote natural logarithm, and i is the firm subscript.
In the “Portfolio sorting” column, the numbers in each line are equal-weighted expected excess return spreads.
Stocks are sorted by size V into deciles, and we report the expected excess return spread between the largest and the
smallest V deciles. Stocks are then sorted by idiosyncratic volatility H into deciles, and we report the expected excess
return spread between the highest and the lowest H deciles. Finally, stocks are first sorted into H deciles, and then,
within each H decile, sorted into V deciles. We report the expected excess return spreads between the largest and the
smallest V portfolios within H deciles 1 to 10.
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Table 12: continued.
Regressions Portfolio sorting
Ri−Rf (%) regressed on Expected excess return spread, EW (%)
log Vi logHi log Vi and logHi V H V 10-1 within each H decile
10-1 10-1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0. Baseline
-0.092 0.922 0.112 1.072 -0.68 2.66 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.37 0.50 0.73 0.94 1.48 -0.74
1. λ = 1
-0.786 3.369 -0.008 3.355 -5.99 8.88 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -24.78
2. ρ = 0
0.173 1.789 0.177 1.792 1.09 5.02 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.39 0.50 0.70 1.16 2.15 5.64
3. Three stocks
-0.135 1.376 0.166 1.596 -0.99 3.94 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.37 0.48 0.65 0.94 1.28 1.56 -0.88
4. Ten stocks
-0.038 0.456 0.065 0.543 -0.28 1.37 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.50 0.84 -0.17
5. No shorting
-0.079 0.917 0.128 1.088 -0.58 2.62 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.46 0.59 0.82 1.06 1.58 -0.76
6. Borrowing < 30%
-0.087 0.920 0.117 1.077 -0.64 2.64 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.39 0.54 0.76 0.98 1.52 -0.75
7. With mutual funds
-0.033 0.392 0.055 0.465 -0.24 1.03 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.53 0.73 -1.14
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